pulled from my final group assignment for Aldo Civico's Conflict Resolution course, fall 2007

Situating Conflict

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, is divided between a Muslim-Arab northern population and a Christian and Anamist/Sub-Saharan African southern population. Conflict in southern Sudan began with the First Sudanese Civil War in 1955, one year before Sudan gained independence from Britain, with conflict between the north and the south lasting for 17 years. The war was brought to a close by the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972, which provided regional autonomy for Southern Sudan and an eleven year cease fire. This agreement was punctuated with violence, providing only a temporary peace in a battle over resources, power, ethnic diversity, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination [1]. A growing number of weapons entered Sudan at this time, which paralleled the development of the national Sudanese armed forces and an increasing Islamicization within the Khartoum Government. Violence resurfaced in 1983, marking the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War, a continuation of the protracted conflict concerning the equitable access to natural resources (oil in particular), the right to self-determination, and religious choice. This war's human suffering, in the form of starvation, deprivation of education and healthcare, and the inaccessibility of humanitarian aid, lasted for 21 years, resulting in over two million deaths, four million persons displaced, and over 600,000 refugees pushed across international borders. This space will explore the failed attempts at bringing a lasting peace to south Sudan, the confluence of events leading to the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, and the impact of this conflict in context of Sudan today.

Primary Actors: Then and Now

Many actors influenced the conflict and resolution of conflict within Southern Sudan. This conflict has been characterized by an asymmetry of power between the Government of Sudan, based in Khartoum, (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) within the South.

The governing political party of Sudan is the National Congress Party (NCP, المؤتمر الوطني), which has its roots in the National Islamic Front [2] and is headed by President Omar al Bashir, a military leader and dictator who assumed office in June 1989. The NCP is now one of the main partners in the power-sharing agreement between the north and south.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the SPLM is the political wing created by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Known collectively as Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), the rebel group was led by Dr. John Garang, and fought in opposition to the military rule and Islamic dominance of the country, until 1989 when the movement joined the primary opposition group within Sudan, the National Democratic Alliance. The SPLM was characterized by a strong conviction for a democratic, secular Sudan.

Reconciliation of the conflict in south Sudan was directly linked to the actions of key international, regional, and institutional stakeholders pressuring for sustainable peace [3] The most significant roles were played by:

• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Established as a regional/intergovernmental vehicle for regional security and political dialogue, through which leaders of Eastern African countries were able to tackle other political and socioeconomic issues in a regional context
• The United States and the US Special Envoy to Sudan headed by former Sen. John Danforth
• UK, Norway, Italy: the parties involved by IGAD
• Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda: IGAD envoys and country ambassadors who formed alliance/team
• Mediator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo: served as Kenya’s Special Envoy to the IGAD-led Sudanese peace process (1997-98) and then as mediator (2001-05)
• The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS): Established under UN Security Council Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005, was established to support the implementation of the CPA and perform humanitarian assistance functions.

The newly establish Government of South Sudan is a semi-autonomous polity governing the ten states of south Sudan during the six year interim from the signing of the CPA until 2011. First established by Dr. Garang via agreement under the CPA, the leadership is now under President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machar . The GoSS joined the Government of National Unity (GONU), as part of the CPA power-sharing agreement, which is composed of the NCP, SPLM, and other parties under the national presidency of Omar al-Bashir, with representation of both the southern and northern political factions in the form of dual vice-presidencies (First Vice President: Salva Kiir, Second Vice President: Ali Osman Taha).

Making Moves: Cycles of Violence and Agreements

Intractability
The conflict between the north and south of Sudan demonstrates characteristics of intractability, as explored by mediation experts by Jacob Bercovitch and Peter Coleman [4], [5]

• Sudan has been divided by asymmetries of power which has created a long standing sense of historical grievance held by southern Sudanese. The SPLM/A identified these core grievances as political marginalization; a centralized, minority-dominated and non-democratic government; the nationalization of customary land and its leasing to a few, mostly external investors; discrimination and racism; a lack of religious and cultural freedom; an agenda of Islamization and Arabization including the imposition of shari'a law and an education system designed to promote this agenda; and underdevelopment and inequality. Whereas the powerholding GoS/NCP identified the lack of development and greed of the SPLM as the causes of war. [6]
• These grievances exacerbated the length of the conflict, while raising the commitment among insurgents, perpetuating Africa's longest running conflict. The duration and pervasiveness of conflict has fostered greater division between warring parties.
• Said divisions, and the associated intractability of this conflict, are at the same time the result of intangible issues such as identity, sovereignty, and values and beliefs, which differ greatly between the Muslim/Arab government of Khartoum, and the Christian and Animist sub-Saharan Africans of the south
• These value differences naturally inform the relationships between all parties of conflict. Both the interactions between the north and the south, as well as the internal interactions within south Sudan are marked by hostility. Factionalism, marked by polarized relationships between the Dinka majority and different parties within the rebel movement, exacerbated conflict: internal divisions intensified fighting in the south, hampering potential peace [7]
• The conflict has been plagued with resistance to third party interventions, despite repeated and concerted attempts, which has continued marking the conflict as intractable for 20+ years. The use of traditional resolution processes and management efforts (diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, use of threats/force on either side) repeatedly failed to bring a lasting solution to the conflict, further demonstrating intractability. Some of these failures are looked at below.

Rippening Stalemate - Failed Negotiations on the Way to Peace

• Koka Dam talks/declaration (Ethiopia, 1986) - Peace negotiations between the Government and the SPLA which agreed to abolish Islamic Law, however, refusal of key major parties to participate undermined the achievements of Koka Dam [8]
• Sudan Peace Initiative (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1988) - The Democratic Unionist Party drafted a cease-fire agreement with the SPLM, however it was not implemented due to opposition from the National Islamic Front
• Addis Ababa talks (Ethiopia and Kenya, 1989) - Talks between the SPLM and the Khartoum Government, joined by former US President Jimmy Carter, achieved nothing. Subsequently, the National Salvation Government, under al-Bashir, sought to establish peace, agreed that Shari'a law would not apply to non-Muslims, however, issue of self-determination was not addressed and saw factionalism within the south undermining this effort [9]
• Abuja talks (Nigeria, 1992-93): Peace talks in the Nigerian capital were weakened by factionalisms, and the GoS vied for majority rule and imposition of Shari’ah law. Southerners rejected this, pressing for a secular democratic system and the right of the south to a referendum on self-determination. Khartoum rejected secularism and the proposed referendum, accordingly the talks rapidly collapsed.
• Peace talks on the Sudan conflict (IGAD 1993-95) As Sudan's violence increased and relationships with neighboring states deteriorated, the Heads of State of the (then) Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) convened as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and undertook consultations with regional governments stakeholders to support a new peace process; Khartoum proposed that IGAD take up the peace process and IGAD established the Standing Committee on Peace in Sudan. Peace negotiations in Nairobi were launched and IGAD presented the Declaration of Principles, with a number of provisions relating to human rights, unity of Sudan, a secular/democratic system, and equitable resource sharing, before the talks collapsed [10]. In 1995 the GoS focused on reaching an internal peace agreement with the factions of the southern rebellion (South Sudan Independence Movement of Riek Machar) while aiming to defeat the SPLM/A militarily. At the same time the SPLM/A built relations with the NDA, to further pressure the government and gain acceptance from other parties. Erstwhile, IGAD focused on gaining western material and political support, ultimately creating the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF); IGAD sought to present this peace process as the sole option for the international community and supported the military assistance of the SPLA by member states (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda).
• Khartoum Peace Agreement (April 1997) Following increasing internal violence, piecemeal peace-brokering with certain southern parties, the military engagement of regional powers, and a growing regional isolation, that GoS returned to negotiations with rebels. Yet regional pressures decreased and the IGAD peace initiative failed to produce serious changes. Hostilities remained and little progress was seen.
• External Initiatives (1999 - 2001) Multiple other peace efforts came forth continuing the path toward ripeness with the demonstration of concerned interest and recognition of potential opportunities"
• June 2001 - Nairobi Peace Talks, attended by President al-Bashir and rebel leader John Garang, failed.
• July 2001 - Libyan/Egyptian Initiative included a national reconciliation conference and reforms
• September 2001 - Following September 11th, the US took more serious interest and engagement in Sudan. President Bush appointed Special Peace Envoy (Senator John Danforth), who invigorated processes with Kenya and IGAD to leverage action and dialogue. IGAD gained further support from UK, Norway, and Italy at this time, and the US extended unilateral sanctions against Sudan for another year

Rippening Stalemate - SPLA Soldiers

Ripeness: Parties, Mediation, Protocols
Zartman explores how conflicts reach a point of ripeness, which is "why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others' efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation [11]. The theory asserts that circumstances like Sudan's, where the asymmetry of power between the north and south eliminates the possibility of attaining a equitable stalemate, repeated failures to attain peace positioned Sudan on a conflict plateau: “a flat and unending terrain without relief.” The surfacing and presence of international pressures for peace, made significant by threats of military interventions and sanctions, represented “the precipice,” that Zartman situates as the perceptual event and momentum for reaching a peaceful negotiation [12]. When both parties are able to perceive the deadlock and the impossibility of a military resolve to the conflict, a ripe moment for resolution emerged. [13]

This moment of ripeness was felt in 2002, when factionalism within the south significantly decreased through the colluding of the SPLM/A, the Sudan People’s Defence Force, and the forces of Sudan National Alliance [SNA] to campaign collectively against the northern government. The greater capacity of the southern rebel movement forced the north to recognize their inability to find a military solution to this conflict and set the stage for the July 2002 signing of the Machokos Protocol. The presence of strong mediation and pressures by IGAD led to the broad framework of principles of governance and procedures for a transitional process, calling for (1) the rewriting of Sudan’s constitution so that Shari’a law would not apply to non-Muslims, and (2) a referendum to be held in six years' time providing for the independence and right to self-determination of South Sudan. At this time the Government and the SPLA also agreed to adopt a temporary ceasefire for duration of negotiations.

While peace seemed promising in the south, violence soared in the western part of the country within the state of Darfur, as rebels in the region claimed neglect by Khartoum for the area. The transitional military and security agreements signed by the GoS and the SPLM/A, during Sepember 2003 in Naivasha, provided a status and arrangement for the integration of the two forces, which led to the signing of a bi-lateral Power Sharing agreement in 2004 and the creation of a new Government of National Unity and a separate Government of Southern Sudan.

Land contest and disputes remained over the three resource-rich areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and the South Blue Nile, but were countered by the 2004 signing of the accord on the sharing of wealth, specifically the division of oil and non-oil resource wealth. Likewise, the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict and The Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were both signed by the Gos and the SPLM in order to guarantee specialized representation and administrative status of these disputed territories. By the end of 2004, the GoS and SPLA pledged before the United Nations Security Council to end the war by December 31 at which point the final two chapters of a peace accord were signed. With the support of international donors and witnesses, south Sudan set on a path to rebuild itself physically and politically, welcoming the reconciliation deal with the National Democratic Alliance that established a power-sharing administration, followed by the establishment of the autonomous government in the south. [14]

Possibilities for Comprehensive Peace
The landmark signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement occurred on January 9th, 2005, marking the end of the Second Sudanese Civil war between a the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. The cornerstones of this agreement, sometimes known as the Naivasha Accords, focused on building democratic governance through political autonomy for southern Sudan during the six year transitional period before a referendum on independence to be held in 2011, and the equal sharing of oil revenues between the north and the south.

A Review of the Protocols: agreements culminating in January 20005

• The Protocol of Machakos: Signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002. Agreement on broad principles of government and governance– peace process extends over six years, will end with referendum to allow S Sudanese to choose between independence or remaining in Sudan; until referendum, the south is autonomous region within Sudan, six month pre-interim phase
• The Protocol on security arrangements during the interim period: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003
• The Protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004 – state resources generated in the South (taxes, oil revenues) will be divided equally between two parties
• The Protocol on Power-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004
• The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004
• The Protocol on the resolution of conflict in Abyei: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004
• Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods: Signed in Naivasha on 31 December 2004

A significant outcome of the signing of the CPA was the establishment of the new Government of National Unity, which united Sudan through a legal and administrative power-sharing structure, giving representation of the south within the NCP and representation of the north within the new Government of Southern Sudan.

Conditions for Successful Signing of the Accords
As previously examined, this conflict reached a point of ripeness before the possibility of resolution surfaced. In particular, the role of third parties to achieving the signing of the CPA is undeniable; the international community’s pressure on Khartoum facilitated the sense that the NCP had no alternative options and forced recognition of the impossibility of a military defeat of the southern rebels. At the same time, the details of this third party’s intervention are significant: IGAD had established both regional and international legitimacy, the focus of their declared principals was specific to the demands of the SPLM (self-determination and secularism) , and they held a long term perspective on the conflict with realistic plans for enacting peace [15]. Finally, the personalities involved and relationships that developed between the stakeholders must be considered significant, as General Lazaro Sumbeiywo’s conviction to finding a peaceful resolution helped build the political will of stakeholders [16]


A Conflicted Greater Sudan
Problems with Peace and Challenges for the Future
While the CPA was achieved at a moment of ripeness and optimism, the Accords have faced serious challenges of implementation, and peace, as outlined by the CPA, has not fully materialized for greater Sudan. The primary challenges are the:

• Bi-lateral nature of the agreement: the structure of the peace accords looks strictly at the conflicts of Sudan through a north-south lens, which serves to marginalize other political, military, and civil society actors within the country. [17]
• Failed Implementation: the NCP has faltered with implementing the accords agreed to with the signing of the CPA. The untimely death of SPLM president Garang was met with regressive behaviors and action by the NCP who have continuously failed to honor the agreement. This is demonstrated through delayed elections, violations of the ceasefire agreement, delayed border demarcations, refusal to implement the protocol on Abyei, and the refusal to withdraw military forces from the oilfields. [18]
• Disintegration and temporary peace: The SPLM and Government of South Sudan withdrew from the Government of National Unity in early October 2007, claiming that the NCP has undermined the implementation of the CPA and that the international community’s focus on the conflict in Darfur has limited the required attention to the implementation of the CPA [19] [20]

It is becoming clear that the CPA is in crisis and without renewed international engagement the agreement could collapse resulting in return to war!

Conflict Across the Country
Ultimately, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is not yet stable, and the continued unrest in the south has been met with a continuation of the crisis in Darfur [21]. The hope for successful implementation of the CPA has not materialized, but is deeply connected to the current circumstances within greater Sudan, which remains plagued with violence, division, and continued insecurity.

• Violence Inspired [22] The SPLA's successes in articulating their demands through violence influenced the mobilization of other actors across Sudan; violence soared in Darfur as the Peace Talks in Naivasha gained stamina. At the same time, the NCP continues to manipulate the international community by focusing attentions on one conflict to diminish external pressures on the other.
• Divided Sudan: North, South, East, West: It is significant to note how deeply connected the conflicts in the south and the west are with each other: years of marginalization by the central government have resulted in similar experiences of massive violence, yet a unified mobilization has not developed as the NCP in Khartoum has consistently pitted the two parts of the country against each other [23]. This is significant when looking at the many advocates of the CPA as a model for peace-building in the western part of the country. Prior to the most recent collapse, the CPA was heralded as a framework for resolution of conflict in Darfur, because the CPA was established a power-sharing model for the entire country, yet the CPA has not succeeded in unifying the parties sharing grievances against the central government. [24] As explored above, the CPA has perpetuated political and economic marginalization of minority groups, thus furthering the divide within the country at large.
• Continued Insecurity: Insecurity for South Sudan means insecurity for all of Sudan: the conflicts affecting Sudan are all interconnected and the peace agreements should not be viewed in isolation [25]. Violence, mistrust, and factionalism in the south only exacerbates tensions within the west, and violence in the west severely limits the feasibility of a United Sudan, upon the referendum scheduled for 2011.

If you're interested in the rest of the presentation/document let me know and I'll email you access.

Sources:
[1] SPLMtoday.com: The Official Website for the Sudan People Liberation Movement, "Civil War: Historical Background", [page 1 of 4], (2007), http://splmtoday.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=30 (accessed November 15).
[2] "Military: Sudan Political Groups", (27-04-2005), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-political-groups.htm (accessed November 15).
[3] Conciliation Resources, "The mediator’s perspective: an interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo", (2006), http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/mediators-perspective.php (accessed December 4).
[4] Jacob Bercovitch, "Characteristics Of Intractable Conflicts," Beyond Intractability, Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, (Boulder: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Characteristics_IC/ (accessed December 4).
[5] Peter Coleman, "Intractable Conflict," in Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman, The Handbook of Conflict (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2000), 429-431.
[6] Jason Matus, Conciliation Resources,“The three areas: a template for regional agreements,” 2006, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/three-areas.php (accessed November 15).
[7] SPLMtoday.com: The Official Website for the Sudan People Liberation Movement, "Civil War: Historical Background", [page 3 of 4], (2007) http://splmtoday.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=30&limit=1&limitstart=2 (accessed November 15).
[8] GlobalSecrity.org, “Military: Sudan Second Civil War,” April 27, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war2.htm (accessed November 15)
[9] Mohamed el-Mukhtar Hussein, Conciliation Resources, “Negotiating peace: the road to Naivasha,” 2006, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/negotiating-naivasha.php (accessed November 15).
[10] Ibid. [The Machokos Breakthrough]
[11] William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond”, in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, Eds, International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, (Committee on International Conflict Resolution, National Research Council, 2000), 228.
[12] Ibid., 228, 229.
[13] William Zartman, “Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts”, in Zartman, William (ed), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 18.
[14] Conciliation Resources, “A summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/cpa-summary.php (accessed November 15).
[15] Conciliation Resources, “Reflecting on the IGAD peace process: An interview with Nicholas (Fink) Haysom," 2006, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/igad-process.php (accessed November 15).
[16] - Conciliation Resources – Mediators Perspective
[17] CrisisGroup.org, "Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead," Africa Report N°106, March 31, 2006 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4055 (accessed November 15).
[18] CrisisGroup.org, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS,” Africa Report N°96, July 25, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3582 (accessed November 15).
[19] “Sudan rivals agree to heal rift,” BBC News Africa, December 5, 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7129001.stm (accessed December 6).
[20] Isaac Vuni, “South Sudan parliament backs SPLM withdrawal from central government,” Sudan Tribune, October 25, 2007,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24413 (accessed November 10).
[21] Roger Winter and John Prendergast, “An All-Sudan Solution: Linking Darfur and the South,” ENOUGH Strategy Paper #9, November 2007: 3-6.
[22] “Q&A: Peace in Sudan,” BBC News Africa, July 8, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3211002.stm (accessed November 15).
[23] Mark Doyle, “Sudan’s interlocking wars,” BBC News Africa, May 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4759325.stm (accessed November 15).
[24] Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations, “Darfur’s Peace Process,” June 18, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13611/#6 (accessed November 15).
[25] International Rescue Committee, “Aid Agencies Warn Sudan Peace Process May Stall without Greater International Attention,” January 8, 2007, http://www.theirc.org/news/aid-agencies-warn-sudan-peace.html (accessed November 15).